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for recognition of their rights to the land than, for example, the Indians in North America have. There have 
only been two major landrights cases in Australia; the first one, Milirrpum and others v. Nabalco and the 
Commonwealth, was brought by the Yolngu of north-eastern Arnhemland in 1969 in protest against the 
granting by the federal government of a mining lease to Nabalco on their land. The case was decided by 
the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory in 1971. The second case, Mabo and others v. the State of 
Queensland was an action initiated in 1982 by the Meriam people from the Torres Strait Islands to prevent 
an increase in government powers over their land. The case was finally decided in the High Court of 
Australia in June 1992. 
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1 
The Significance of Court Recogni-
tion of Landrights in Australia 
In Australia, Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders have made much less 
use of the courts in the struggle for recognition of their rights to the land 
than, for example, the Indians in ~orth America have. There have only 
been two major landrights cases in Australia; the first one, Milirrpum and 
others v. Nabalco and the Commonwealth, was brought by the Yolngu of 
north-eastern Arnhemland in 1969 in protest against the granting by the 
federal government of a mining lease to Nabalco on their land. The case 
was decided by the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory in 1971. The 
second case, Mabo and others v. the State of Queensland was an action 
initiated in 1982 by the Meriam people from the Torres Strait Islands to 
prevent an increase in government powers over their land. The case was 
finally decided in the High Court of Australia in June 1992. 
In both cases, the central issue was whether the common law inherited 
from Britain recognized the existence of indigenous title to the land. It was 
attempted to prove that this title had survived the acquisition of sover-
eignty by the British and that, although very different from the individual 
title of the ordinary landowner among white Australians, the indigenous 
communal rights to the land were of a kind recognizable by the Australian 
legal system. 
Judge Blackburn in Milirrpum v. Nabalco decided most of the issues in-
volved in the case against the Aborigines. Most importantly, he found that 
the Australian common law did not and never had recognized any rights 
to the land as residing in the Aborigines. The decision thus seemed to 
indicate that litigation had little to offer Aborigines in this area. However, 
this judgement was reversed when the High Court in the Mabo-case de-
cided that the common law did recognize the existence of 'communal 
native title'; in the decision some long-standing legal doctrines were 
rejected. 
This development raises some interesting questions about judicial 
decision-making, such as what determines the way in which decisions are 
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made and what is actually the function of the judge. A discussion of these 
factors in relation to the landrights cases touches on some fundamental 
aspects of the legal process. 
In general, the legal system is designed to maintain certain standards of 
social interaction; as such it is based on the moral assumptions current in 
society. In ordinary cases, the judge need not consider this underlying 
element, but will be able to resolve the issues by applying a body of 
accepted legal rules, laid down in earlier judgements or statutes. However, 
in extraordinary cases, where there is no agreement about what the law 
is, the decision of the case is a much more complicated task. Judges will 
examine previous decisions to find principles of law which are relevant to 
the case before them. As pointed out by many legal theorists/ they will 
also by guided by notions of what is fair, just or desirable as they are 
perceived by the legal profession and the population in general. Ultimate-
ly, this means that in 'hard' cases the decision is to a considerable extent 
determined by the moral principles underlying the legal system. 
This applies to the Australian landrights cases; in the context of these 
cases, however, it is important to call attention to an even more funda-
mental source of influence on the decision. It is probably obvious that 
legal as well as moral principles are culturally determined; they are ne-
cessarily directed towards the continued existence and development of the 
culture of which they are expressions. At the most basic level, judges are 
influenced by the cultural background of the legal system and by their 
own cultural heritage in general. This is always so, but in the present con-
text it acquires supreme importance. When groups of people such as the 
Aborigines or the Islanders involuntarily become subject to a legal system 
other than their own, this by definition involves a confrontation in court 
as well as elsewhere between two different cultures; on the one hand that 
of the indigenous people, on the other that of the 'colonizers'. When it is 
recognized that the legal system itself is a dynamic part of the latter, it 
becomes dear that a very fundamental cultural bias may easily influence 
the outcome of the litigation process. 
There were signs of this cultural influence in Blackburn's decision of 
Milirrpum v. Nabalco. It was, for instance, an important factor in his find-
ings on the Aboriginal land tenure system. 
In spite of Blackburn's obvious goodwill and best intentions to grasp the 
very complicated Aboriginal land system, he was basically incapable of 
understanding it on its own premises. Without realizing it he was unable 
to put aside his habitual, culturally defined model for understanding the 
world. The judge's discussion of the antiquity of Aboriginal links with the 
land provides an example of this. The Yolngu had to prove that the same 
clans were connected with the same land as they had been in 1788 when 
the colony of New South Wales came into existence. It turned out that 
some clans had died out and Blackburn therefore concluded that the rela-
tionship was no longer the same. To the Aborigines, on the other hand, no 
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change had taken place. Their system of succession, based on the myth<r 
logy of the Dreamtime, in such situations dictates the transfer of land 
along indirect descent lines, so the land in question had remained in the 
possession of its rightful owners. Blackburn, however, maintained that 'the 
issues before the court are such that the mere existence of the possibility 
of a historical explanation- if such a possibility exists ... is of considerable 
importance'.2 
By suggesting that 'factual' historical explanations of changes were more 
important to the court than mythological ones, he was removing the issue 
outside the system within which it existed. In Aboriginal philosophy, 
mythology and history cannot be separated, they are simply one. Rather 
than accepting the system at face value, Blackburn wanted the individual 
elements to be explicable in terms which were acceptable to the common 
law. 
Another instance of this was the judge's rejection of the plaintiffs' claim 
that their notions of ownership could be characterized as proprietary. Al-
though the judge in one of the most notable findings of the decision recog-
nized that the Aboriginal system constitued a 'system of law' (which the 
defendants had claimed it did not), he held that Aboriginal relations with 
the land did not conform sufficiently to the ideas of land ownership 
known to him to be termed a 'proprietary right' .3 There is little doubt that 
a concept of property as a private economic interest exercized considerable 
influence on the judge in deciding this issue. This notion of property, far 
from being a universal principle, is finnly embedded in the agrarian mode 
of subsistence of a group of closely related societies based on what we 
\ today term European or Western culture. In Blackburn's reasoning a Eurcr 
t centric legal framework based on this development left little or no room 
t for the different concept of ownership held by a hunter-gatherer commun-
s ity such as that of the Yolngu. 
lt Other evidence of the marked influence of Blackburn's cultural back-
e ground appeared in his treatment of various historical material; as the his-
torian, Henry Reynolds, has pointed out, it showed Blackburn to represent 
>f I an Australian historical tradition which consistently has held that in the 
l- past no official attempt was ever made to recognize Aboriginal title to the 
land.4 
\e Reynolds particularly refers to Blackburn's discussion of government atti-
of tudes in connection with the founding of the colony of South Australia in 
le 1836. Blackburn at the most found indications of a 'principle of benevol-
:te ence' in government actions,5 whereas Reynolds has argued convincingly 
t\e that the colonial office was concerned about the legal rights of the Aborig-
f\e ines. 
en Another historical event which Blackburn mentioned was 'Batman's 
lat Treaty' from 1835, in which a colonist claimed to have bought some land 
La- &om the Aborigines. Blackburn saw the government nullification of the 
no 'treaty' as a sign of official rejection of Aboriginal title to the land/ but it 
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is, in fact, much more reasonable to see it as a confirmation of the prin-
ciple that British subjects could only acquire land through a grant from the 
Crown, than as a denial of Aboriginal landrights. It seems to be another 
indication of the influence of a particular historical tradition which has 
attempted to strengthen white claims to the land by simplifying govern-
ment attitudes (especially those current during the 1830s and '40s). 
The ultimate cementing of this tradition was Blackburn's refusal to con-
sider recent historical research, which has thrown new light on the early 
colonization of Australia. This was particularly relevant in connection with 
the discussion of the legal categorization of the colony of New South 
Wales. It has been maintained in the courts of Australia that it was a so-
called colony of settlement, legally to be regarded as terra nullius (no-
man's land). In the words of the Privy Council in 1889 it was 'a colony 
which consisted of a tract of territory practically unoccupied, without 
settled inhabitants or settled law, at the time when it was peacefully 
annexed to the British dominions' _7 
Although historical research has proved beyond doubt what the Aborig-
ines always knew, that the country was not 'practically unoccupied', not 
'without settled inhabitants or settled law', and far from 'peacefully 
annexed', Blackburn felt unable to depart from the decision of the Privy 
Council; he said 'the question is not one of fact but of law ... it is beyond 
the power of this court to decide otherwise than that New South Wales 
came into the category of a settled or occupied colony' .8 The judicial 
acceptance of the doctrine of terra nullius which can only be termed a legal 
fiction, is an example of the Eurocentric foundations of the law. Perhaps 
better than anything this exposes the difficulties facing Aboriginal litigants 
in the Australian legal system. 
The opholding of the Privy Council decision is also a powerful example 
of the significance of precedent in the judicial process. Blackburn relied 
heavily on previous decisions on the main issue, that is, common law re-
cognition of indigenous title. Because there were no decisions on this issue 
from Australia, he examined judgements in similar cases from other com-
mon law countries such as the USA, Canada, and New Zealand as well as 
Privy Council decisions from Africa and India, stretching from the early 
19th century to the present; the many decisions are not easily reconcilable. 
Some of them have contained what seems like clear recognition of indi-
genous title as a legal right (e.g. Johnson v. Mcintosh and Worcester v. 
State of Georgia, USA and Regina v. Symonds, New Zealand), whereas 
others seem just as clearly to reject the same notion (e.g. Tee-Hit-Ton v. 
the United States, USA, the early stages of Calder v. the Attorney-General, 
Canada and Wi Parata v. the Bishop of Wellington, New Zealand). 
Blackburn's treatment of these decisions leaves the impression that the 
cases which have been considered by many scholars to uphold common 
law recognition of indigenous title, he found unpersuasive or distinguish-
able from the Australian sitiuation; on the other hand, judgements (some 
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of them much criticized) unfavourable to the concept, he found persuas-
ive. It is thus possible to discern a certain line in Blackburn's interpretation 
of other judgements. Yet Blackburn indicated several times that he felt 
compelled by the precedent to reach the conclusions he did, sometimes 
even seeming to regret the result.9 
These two observations seem contradictory; in fact, they reflect two di-
verging views among legal theorists on the nature of the doctrine of pre-
cedent. In traditional jurisprudence it is often maintained that in all cases 
turning on a point of law it is possible to discover one or more reasons de-
termining the decision (the ratio decidendi), which are applicable in later 
cases according to certain rules.10 This implies that the discovery and 
application of such rationes, although possibly demanding on the judge, is 
nevertheless a fairly straightforward business. This view is related to the 
general tradition, in existence among the English legal profession for 
centuries, that the judiciary do not play an active law-making role, but 
merely arrive at their decisions through legal reasoning. The law contains 
all the principles and rules necessary to determine any case; the job of the 
judge is to discover what the law is, not to create it. These ideas were to 
a certain extent reflected in Blackburn's words. 
It is a tradition, however, which leaves little room for what the Aus-
tralian professor of law, Julius Stone, calls 'the leeways of choice' .11 This 
idea is based on a recognition of the fact that judges must constantly make 
choices when establishing the rationes of previous decisions - exactly how 
should the words be understood? In what way were the legal propositions 
applied? What was in fact the central element of the decision? and so on. 
The process of choice-making also covers the application of precedent to 
the case before the judge. Stone emphasizes that the element of choice can-
not be avoided, it is simply a part of the doctrine of precedent. Thus, in 
his judgement Blackburn made a number of choices of interpretation and 
distinguishment which produced a particular reading of precedent. Once 
it is openly recognized that the judge is not merely mechanically applying 
the law, it becomes clear that, to a limited extent, the judge may have a 
law-making function. This again makes it important to consider what 
detennines the way in which he or she makes the choices involved in the 
decision. 
Some legal theorists, especially the so-called realists in the USA, have 
underlined the influence of ideologies and values, or even personal beliefs, 
on judicial decisions. There is generally a strong reaction in the legal pro-
fession against such emphasis on subjectivity in decision-making. Julius 
Stone, too, while not denying that judges have personal value commit-
ments and that they do and should take extra-legal factors into considera-
tion, seems to consider that these personal views are largely balanced by 
'steadying factors'. Judges will be kept in line by the need and desire to 
oonfonn to the standards for judicial behaviour as well as to the proced-
ural rules laid down and accepted by the legal profession. Furthermore, 
......... 
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it is claimed, judges in a democratic society will be influenced by current 
opinion ensuring that their judgement will be acceptable.12 This ties up 
with the point made earlier that, ultimately, judges will base their judge-
ment in difficult cases on the moral and cultural assumptions underlying 
the legal system. In the final analysis, Blackburn's decision on precedent 
was determined by his cultural background to as large an extent as his 
reasoning on anthropological and historical material. Although Blackburn 
did not harbour any of the discriminatory attitudes towards Aborigines 
which have been common in Australia, his judgement in several ways re-
flected the long tradition of denying Aborigines their rights. 
One of the major implications of what has been said so far, however, is 
that a potential for change is an integral part of the judicial process. As 
Stone points out, the principle of binding the courts to previous decisions 
is inherently conservative, yet that same principle also contains elements 
which enables the common law to develop, through the judge, along with 
the rest of society. The choices of interpretation facing the judge imply 
that in many cases alternative, even opposing interpretations of precedent 
are possible (as, indeed, many legal scholars have claimed in connection 
with Milirrpum v. Nabalco). Furthermore, it has been argued here that an 
important element which may influence the judge's reasoning is a kind of 
cultural 'blockage' which can predetermine the judge's understanding of 
the issues. If this is correct, it follows that greater awareness among jurists 
as well as the general public of such ethnocentrism could radically alter 
the outcome of similar cases. 
That these are not frivolous or utopian ideas is proved by recent devel-
opments. The Mabo-case is the latest example of this, but other cases since 
Milirrpum v. Nabalco have indicated a change of attitude in judicial atti-
tudes. 
In Australia, Coe v. the Commonwealth from 1977 was an attempt by the 
Aboriginal people, represented by Poul Coe, to challenge the sovereignty 
over Australia of the Commonwealth Government. The claim was that the 
Aborigines were in sovereign possession of Australia in 1788 and had 
never ceded this to anyone. For various reasons the case was dismissed, 
but in the process of reaching this decison, two of the judges of the High 
Court, Murphy and Jacobs, made some comments which are relevant in 
the present context. Although they rejected the challenge to the sover-
eignty of the Commonwealth, they would both allow a discussion of the 
colonial status of Australia. In particular, Murphy rejected the application 
of the concept of terra nullius to Australia or any other inhabited country. 
He also rejected the Privy Coundl statement from 1889 that Australia 
was acquired by 'peaceful annexation': 
The Aborigines did not give up their lands peacefully; they were removed force-
fully from the lands by United Kingdom forces or the European colonists in what 
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by the Privy Council may be regarded as having been made in ignorance or as a 
convenient falsehood to justify the taking of the Aborigines' land.13 
In this manner, the judge was prepared to allow the influence of recent 
historical research on his decision on the applicability of earlier judicial 
statements. This suggested a most important change. 
This seems to have been part of a broader development in the common 
law countries. In Canada, where there have been many more court cases 
in which Indians and Inuit have tried to obtain recognition and enforce-
ment of their rights, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in 1973 
found that Indian title to the land did exist as a legal right. The case, 
Calder v. the Attorney-General, was based on an application by the 
Nishga Indians of British Columbia for a declaration that their title had 
never been extinguished. Their application had been rejected in British 
Columbia by the Supreme Court as well as the Court of Appeal; although 
the action was dismissed on a technicality by the Supreme Court of 
Canada, the general recognition of Indian title was a significant statement 
by the court. One of the judges, Hall, said: 'the Nishgas in fact are and 
were from time immemorial a distinctive cultural entity with concepts of 
ownership indigenous to their culture and capable of articulation under 
the common law.'14 
Hall also offered an important comment on the role played by modem 
research: 
The assessment and interpretation of the historical documents and enactments ten-
dered in evidence must be approached in the light of present-day research and 
knowledge disregarding ancient concepts formulated when understanding of the 
customs and culture of our original people was rudimentary and incomplete and 
when they were thou§ht to be wholly without cohesion, laws or culture, in effect 
a sub-human species. 
By distancing himself from the prejudice of especially some late 19th and 
early 20th century judicial statements, Hall indicated the importance of 
awareness of the judge's underlying, perhaps even subconscious, attitudes 
towards the indigenous population. In Guerin v. the Queen from 1984, the 
Supreme Court of Canada stated that the Indian title to the land should 
be understood according to the Indian system (sui generis) rather than be 
desaibed in terms of the European law of property.16 In this way both 
decisions made steps towards understanding the indigenous system in its 
own right. 
These and several other cases show that the 1970s saw the growth of a 
Une of judicial thinking which was prepared to allow reconsideration of 
hitherto unquestioned doctrines if they were contrary to modem 'ideas of 
justice'.lt also encouraged greater awareness of the cultural foundation of 
such notions as property, in order to avoid an unreasonable demand for 
conformity by indigenous systems to concepts totally foreign to them. As 
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will be seen, both aspects of this 'new judicial attitude' were present in the 
decision of the Mabo-case. 
An initial victory was gained by the plaintiffs in the High Court in 1988 
when it was found by the Court that the Queenslimd Coast Declaratory Act 
1985 enacted by the government in response to the action by the Islanders 
was inconsistent with the Commonwealth Racial Discrimination Act and 
thus invalid. The Queensland act claimed that all traditional rights to the 
land were extinguished without right to compensation when the Torres 
Strait Islands were annexed in the 19th century. The general importance 
of the High Court finding was pointed out by one of the judges: 
... this means that if traditional native title was not extinguished before the Racilll 
Discrimination Ad came into force, a State law which seeks to extinguish it will now 
fail ... because section 10(1) of [that Act) clothes the holders of traditional native title 
who are of the native ethnic group with the same immunity from legislative inter· 
ference with their enjoyment of their human right to own and inherit property as 
it clothes other persons in the community.17 
In other words, indigenous title still existing is protected against arbitrary 
extinguishment without compensation by the Radal Discrimination Act. 
Clearly an important finding. 
It remained to be decided, however, if Islander title had survived an-
nexation. This essential point was decided in the affirmative by six judges, 
one judge dissenting, in the High Court in June 1992. The main finding of 
the court was that 'the common law of this country recognizes a form of 
native title which, in the cases where it has not been extinguished, reflects 
the entitlement of the indigenous inhabitants, in accordance with their 
laws and customs, to their traditionallands'.18 
This finding represents a dramatic change in Australian legal thinking 
on indigenous landrights. In reaching their decision, the judges considered 
some of the judgements from other common law courts dealt with by 
Blackburn; apart from the dissenting judge, they all interpreted them in 
a way which supported the recognition by the common law of 'communal 
native title'. The High Court thus overruled the conclusions reached by 
Blackburn. 
The attitude underlying this reading of precedent was spelled out in the 
process of rejecting some well-established legal propositions of Australian 
law. The reasons for judgement written by Brennan deal with this in de-
tail. The line of argument which he followed in order to recognize the con-
tinued existence of indigenous title was that the British Crown had 
acquired the underlying, 'radical' title to the land , but not full possession 
('beneficial ownership'). The Crown's title was thus not inconsistent with 
indigenous title, which to the extent that it had not been extinguished by 
legislation or inconsistent grants to others, continued to exist. 
This, however was in opposition to several Australian judgements, which 
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land, thus constituting a serious procedural obstacle. To recognize indigen-
ous title meant rejecting these judgements. Brennan saw the problem in 
the following way: 
In discharging its duty to declare the common law of Australia, this Court is not 
free to adopt rules that accord with contemporary notions of justice and human 
rights if their adoption would fracture the skeleton of prindple which gives the 
body of our law its shape and internal consistency .... The peace and order of Aus-
tralian society is built on the legal system. It can be modified to bring it into 
conformity with contemporary notions of justice and human rights, but it cannot 
be destroyed. It is not possible, a priori, to distinguish between cases that express 
a skeletal prindple and those which do not, but no case can command unquestion-
ing adherence if the rule it expresses seriously offends the value of justice and 
human rights (especially equality before the Jaw) which are aspirations of the 
contemporary Australian legal system. If a postulated rule of the common law 
expressed in earlier cases seriously offends those contemporary values, the question 
arises whether the rule should be maintained and applied. (pp. 16-17) 
Consequently, Brennan proceded to examine the cases which have estab-
lished the full ownership of land of the Crown. 
Brennan is quoted at length because the reasoning of the judge here 
shows with great clarity the way in which the judicial process allows 
scope for the development of the law when attitudes in society demand 
it. The judge is able to find that because precedent (which has not for-
merly been questioned) is at odds with 'contemporary notions of justice and 
human rights' it is required that the legal system re-examines that 
precedent. This reasoning bears out the claim by legal theorists noted 
earlier that judges are guided by 'principles of what is fair, just or 
desirable'. It is hardly surprising, given the words the judge uses, that he 
finds that 'none of the grounds advanced for attributing to the Crown an 
universal and absolute ownership of colonial land is acceptable' (p. 43). 
Upholding the precedent and thus finding that one of the 'skeletal prin-
dples' of Australian law offends notions of justice and human rights 
would surely have been an unacceptable finding to have been reached by 
the highest court of the nation. 
Perhaps an even better example of the ability of the court to depart from 
established legal opinion was the rejection of the doctrine of terra nullius. 
Brennan reviewed the process by which the concept of no-man's land 
came to be applied to countries inhabited by hunter-gatherers and other 
indigenous peoples and recognized that this was based on the belief that 
indigenous peoples were considered uncivilized and therefore not to be 
taken into account. He then said: 'The facts as we know them today do 
not fit the "absence of law" or ''barbarian" theory underpinning the colo-
nial reception of the common law of England. That being so, there is no 
warrant for applying in these times rules of the common law which were 
the product of that theory' (p. 27). 
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Acknowledgement of the importance of the 'facts as we know them 
today' is clearly a repudiation of Blackburn's conclusion on this issue and 
an endorsement of the trends noted in the cases of the 1970s mentioned 
earlier. Having remarked that the whole theory of terra nullius was 'false 
in fact and unacceptable in our society', the judge said: 'Whatever the 
justification advanced in earlier days for refusing to recognize the rights 
and interests in land of the indigenous inhabitants of settled colonies, an 
unjust and discriminatory doctrine of that kind can no longer be ac-
cepted' (p. 30). In this way Brennan rejected a legal fiction which had 
become unacceptable in society. The words used by Deane and Gaudron 
were even stronger: 
The acts and events by which [the] disposession [of the Aborigines] in legal theory 
was carried into practical effect constitute the darkest aspect of the history of this 
nation. The nation as a whole must remain diminished unless and until there is an 
acknowledgement of, and retreat from, those past injustices. In these circumstances 
the Court is under a clear duty to re-examine the two propositions [terra nullius and 
the full ownership of the land by the government] ... that re-examination compels 
their rejection. (p. 100) 
Dawson (the dissenting judge), however, rejected any ability of the judi-
ciary to change the law. Although he recognized that relations between 
Aborigines and whites have left a stain on Australian history he said: 
The policy which lay behind the legal regime was determined politically and how-
ever insensitive the politics may now seem to have been, a change in view does not 
of itself mean a change in the law. It requires the implementation of a new policy 
to do that and that is a matter for government rather than for the courts. In the 
meantime it would be wrong to attempt to revise history or to fail to recognize its 
legal impact, however unpalatable it may now seem. (p. 138) 
The judge admitted that the attitude towards the issue has changed (he 
mentioned 'the degree of condemnation which is nowadays apt to accom-
pany any account [of the past]' (p. 138) but denied any obligation on the 
part of the court to take this into consideration. He clearly questioned the 
attempt by the other judges to change the direction of the law. Had this 
attitude been taken by the majority, so that indigenous title had been re-
jected, Aborigines and Islanders would at the very least have lost complete 
confidence in the Australian legal system. 
As a final indication of the 'new thinking' in the judgement, it may be 
mentioned that all the judges attempted to deal with the nature of indi-
genous interests in the land in a way which recognized their independent 
character. Perhaps the most significant statement on this question was 
made by Toohey. He criticized the demand that indigenous title should 
conform to notions of private property in order to be recognizable. On the 
contrary he felt that 'inquiries into the nature of traditional title are 
essentially irrelevant'. According to the judge, the common law recognizes 
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indigenous title as soon as its existence has been established by showing 
a recurrent pattern of physical presence on the land. In Toohey's words: 
'rhus traditional title is rooted in physical presence. That the use of the 
land was meaningful must be proved but it is to be understood from the 
point of view of the members of the society' (p. 186). The judicial recog-
nition that in this kind of case one must not blindly apply the concepts of 
the judge's own legal system to another system is of great significance. 
Thus it may be concluded that the decision of the Mabo-case reflects a 
growing awareness in the Australian judiciary of the need for a culturally 
unbiased approach to the understanding of indigenous principles of land-
ownership. It also reveals an attitude among a majority of the judges to 
the issues which enabled them to reinterpret and even depart from pre-
cedent in order to recognize the existence of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander title to the land. It clearly shows that the judges were influenced 
by the need, increasingly seen by sections of the population, for the Aus-
tralian nation to come to terms with the impact of colonization on the in-
digenous peoples of the country. In this respect, the case has demonstrated 
the ability of the judicial process to create changes in the law in excep-
tional circumstances. The case has not resolved all the problems facing 
Aborigines and Islanders trying to recover the land they have lost; how-
ever, there is little doubt that the rejection by the High Court of some of 
the long-lived fictions which have justified the dispossession of these 
peoples will be of great significance in the future development of relations 
between the indigenous population and the rest of the Australian popula-
tion. 
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PORT ESSINGTON (NT)* 
Nowhere is the sea so entrappped by land, 
a smooth basin flooding and draining silently. 
Here the tailed, keeled reptile-shape is best. 
Kunapipi, that old Snake-Lady, 
has swallowed an endless plain, 
spews back a third at each low tide. 
This lace-coast, froth-land 
mixed with sea, sea patterned with land, 
tide country, crocodile-totem land, 
turns fresh-water floodplain, or salt-marsh 
as snows thicken or thin on Antarctica. 
An ocean with ripples in place of waves 
echoes and gurgles against clay cliffs. 
The air is a warm-mousse 
kiss, above soft waves friendly to the turtle 
and the bark-mat canoe with turned-up sides. 
In its shallows the stingray slides easily, 
